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Abstract
Background: The recent proliferation of self-tracking technologies has allowed individuals to generate significant quantities
of data about their lifestyle. These data can be used to support health interventions and monitor outcomes. However, these data
are often stored and processed by vendors who have commercial motivations, and thus, they may not be treated with the sensitivity
with which other medical data are treated. As sensors and apps that enable self-tracking continue to become more sophisticated,
the privacy implications become more severe in turn. However, methods for systematically identifying privacy issues in such
apps are currently lacking.
Objective: The objective of our study was to understand how current mass-market apps perform with respect to privacy. We
did this by introducing a set of heuristics for evaluating privacy characteristics of self-tracking services.
Methods: Using our heuristics, we conducted an analysis of 64 popular self-tracking services to determine the extent to which
the services satisfy various dimensions of privacy. We then used descriptive statistics and statistical models to explore whether
any particular categories of an app perform better than others in terms of privacy.
Results: We found that the majority of services examined failed to provide users with full access to their own data, did not
acquire sufficient consent for the use of the data, or inadequately extended controls over disclosures to third parties. Furthermore,
the type of app, in terms of the category of data collected, was not a useful predictor of its privacy. However, we found that apps
that collected health-related data (eg, exercise and weight) performed worse for privacy than those designed for other types of
self-tracking.
Conclusions: Our study draws attention to the poor performance of current self-tracking technologies in terms of privacy,
motivating the need for standards that can ensure that future self-tracking apps are stronger with respect to upholding users’
privacy. Our heuristic evaluation method supports the retrospective evaluation of privacy in self-tracking apps and can be used
as a prescriptive framework to achieve privacy-by-design in future apps.
(JMIR Mhealth Uhealth 2018;6(10):e185)   doi:10.2196/mhealth.9217
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Introduction
The quantified self (QS) movement refers to the use of
self-tracking technologies to capture data about different facets
of a person’s life [1]. Recent advances in sensing technologies
have allowed people to track a variety of life attributes, ranging
from physical exercise to mood, sleep, and work productivity
[2]. Collecting these data allows people to engage in
self-improvement or behavioral change or to satisfy intellectual
curiosity [3]. In the medical domain, self-tracking is increasingly
being used to support health-related outcomes, with patients
using data to reflect on their recovery [4] and clinicians
deploying tracking technologies to monitor patients [5].
While many of the services that enable self-tracking are free or
low cost, users may unwittingly be paying a price by
surrendering their privacy to these services [6]. That is, users
of self-tracking apps may find that their privacy is eroded
because they lack control over how their data are collected,
stored, and analyzed by self-tracking apps, and they may, in
turn, have no say in how these data are shared with third parties.
These issues point toward a need to understand privacy issues
in self-tracking apps, particularly mobile health (mHealth) apps,
which collect medical and health-related data. Such technologies
frequently operate in an uncertain regulatory space and may not
be afforded the protections and scrutiny that are given to other
medical data, for example, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act in the United States or National Health
Service oversight in the United Kingdom.
Research has shown that self-tracking apps can give rise to
privacy concerns. For example, apps that collect data about
dementia often fail to disclose how the data are processed [7],
and the vast majority of mHealth apps have, at least, some
potential for information security and privacy infringements
[8]. Other work has examined the privacy policies of
self-tracking app vendors and identified privacy concerns [9].
However, these studies only focused on a small subset of apps.
Recent years have witnessed increased public awareness of
privacy issues [10-12], and users are known to be concerned
about the improper use of sensitive data [13]. This suggests a
need to evaluate the broader landscape in order to provide a
characterization of privacy risks that can emerge in mHealth
apps that are intended for self-tracking. Understanding potential
privacy risks will, then, allow designers to account for such
issues when creating self-tracking apps in the future.
However, currently, there is a lack of techniques for evaluating
the privacy-related features of self-tracking apps. While
researchers have developed frameworks for eliciting privacy
requirements and achieving privacy-by-design [14-16], these
are general frameworks that do not consider the specifics of
self-tracking and mHealth apps. Similarly, privacy impact
assessments [17-19] can offer a generalized analysis for large
systems but are not designed for issues specific to mHealth apps.
The Data Protection Impact Assessments mandated by Article
35 of the European Union’s (EU’s) General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) [20] specify that the assessment must be
systematic but give no guidance regarding the method or, even,
regarding whether health-related data, such as those in mHealth
apps, need special treatment. Recent privacy frameworks that
focus on the Internet of Things [21] are closer to the mHealth
domain, but these frameworks provide few insights into the
effectiveness of features that are intended to control the sharing
and access of personal data in self-tracking apps.
The aim of this study was to understand how current
self-tracking apps perform with respect to privacy. To do this,
we used a set of 26 heuristics to evaluate privacy in self-tracking
technologies. These heuristics span 4 dimensions: notice and
awareness, choice and consent, access and participation, and
social disclosure usability. The heuristics are intended to support
systematic appraisal of the ways in which self-tracking apps
can either uphold or impinge on users’ privacy. We
demonstrated the practical value of the heuristics by evaluating
the privacy-related features of 64 popular self-tracking apps.
Furthermore, we identified which dimensions of privacy were
best met and explored whether certain types of services
performed better than others. In addition, we examined a number
of nonhealth-related apps, which enable self-tracking, allowing
us to determine whether mHealth apps exhibit distinctive privacy
characteristics.
The paper makes two contributions. First, the heuristics provide
a low-cost approach for evaluating privacy in mHealth services,
building on the use of the heuristics in studies of privacy in
other domains [22-25] and extending the work of Furano et al
[26], who developed a set of privacy heuristics for evaluating
personal health records. Our heuristics can support the
evaluation of self-tracking apps more generally and will allow
researchers to gauge the ways in which privacy is met in future
apps. Furthermore, the heuristics can provide a prescriptive
privacy framework for designers, allowing them to achieve
privacy-by-design in new mHealth services.
Our second contribution is an investigation of the state of
privacy in mHealth services. We found that the category of data
collected by an app is not a useful predictor of its overall privacy
score, suggesting that poor support for privacy is an issue that
pervades the self-tracking landscape. In addition, we showed
that mHealth apps perform worse than other types of
self-tracking apps in terms of privacy. This draws attention to
the need for careful scrutiny of privacy practices within these
apps, as well as the need to develop standards to ensure that
mHealth apps pay sufficient regard to user privacy in the future.
Methods
Developing the Heuristics
Our heuristic analysis focuses on the information and controls
given to the users to help them decide whether they wish to use
a particular app, and which later help them selectively disclose
their data to others. This includes the app’s user interface as
well as its terms of service and privacy policies. Our heuristics
do not focus on the “invisible” facets of privacy, which can
affect end users, such as the sharing or selling of data without
users’ consent; this is because it is difficult to assess whether
these outcomes will arise when deciding to use an app. We,
therefore, focused on what is known about an app at the point
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of use, given the claims made in its supporting documentation
and the user interface design.
Our heuristic analysis addresses four key questions that users
may ask when using self-tracking apps:
1. Am I informed about what happens to my data before I use
this app?
2. Do I have control over my data once I start using the app?
3. Do I have access to the data I have provided?
4. Can I use features that allow me to control the disclosure
of data to third parties?
With these questions in mind, we began by reviewing sources
in the regulatory landscape and relevant privacy literature
(Figure 1; Multimedia Appendix 1) [27]. First, we used 3
categories from the FTC’s Fair Information Practices [28] policy
as an initial guiding framework; these were notice or awareness,
choice or consent, and access or participation. Each of these
addresses a different aspect of information privacy (Table 1).
To populate these categories with appropriate heuristics, we
considered some of the primary privacy concerns that manifest
in self-tracking, such as ambiguous ownership and access to
data, the significance of where data are stored, whether consent
to store and process data can be revoked, and changes in privacy
policies [29]. We then considered the EU’s GDPR, which
updates and harmonizes data protection legislation across the
EU, and incorporated considerations from this into our
framework. Example provisions include the requirement for
data to be portable, unambiguous consent, and the right to be
forgotten [30]. In addition, we drew on the STRAP Framework
[22], a technique that is aimed at supporting analysts in
identifying privacy and security concerns during early design.
Finally, we used Inostroza et al’s usability heuristics for
touchscreen mobile devices [31] to define the category of social
disclosure usability, which refers to the usability of features
that allow users to share QS data with a third-party service, for
example, a social networking site (SNS). These heuristics assess
concerns including the ability to prevent errors and the
availability of support, both of which are relevant when
considering interfaces that permit the disclosure of QS data. For
example, an interface for supporting disclosure may include
features for selecting the audience and subsets of content to
share. Difficulty in the use of these features may lead to errors
in sharing, causing privacy violations.
An initial set of heuristics was pilot-tested by 3 reviewers, all
of whom were experts in HCI or software engineering and had
personal experience of using self-tracking apps. The pilot tests
explored whether the heuristics could be applied consistently
across different apps and whether they were sufficiently
exhaustive to capture the interactions encountered. Examples
of improvements that arose from these tests included the
rearrangement of 4 heuristics to better fit the Fair Information
Practices categories and the addition of 1 heuristic to assess the
granularity of disclosures to social networking services.
These improvements led to a final set of 26 heuristics
(Multimedia Appendix 1) [27]. The heuristics include a
combination of dichotomous and ordinal items, where a higher
score for each item indicates better privacy-preserving
characteristics within the target app. Figure 1 shows how the
regulatory and market landscape led to the choices of heuristics
and apps for this study.
Figure 1. How the regulatory and market landscape was fed into the design of the heuristics and the choice of apps to study. GDPR: General Data
Protection Regulation; FIPS: Fair Information Practices; QS: quantified self.
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Table 1. The 26 heuristics (H) present in our evaluation technique.
HeuristicCategory description and numbera
Notice or Awareness: These heuristics concern what people are told about how their data are used before their personal information is col-
lected, such as the terms of service or privacy policies.
Before data are shared with a remote actor, the entity collecting the data is explicitly identified.H1
Before data are shared with a remote actor, the uses of the data are explicitly identified.H2
Before data are shared with a remote actor, the potential recipients are explicitly identified.H3
The nature and means of the data collected are explicitly identified.H4
Steps taken to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and quality of data are explained.H5
For those of above satisfied, notice is sufficiently explicit.H6
Can control when data are used for nonoperational secondary use, such as marketing or research.H7
Choice or Consent: These include the controls people have over use of their data, such as whether to permit secondary uses of their data,
including marketing.
Consent acquired before data shared with remote actor.H8
Consent is explicitly opt-in: no preticked checkboxes, etc.H9
Can choose which data types are automatically collected from sensors or other sources, for example, connect a
finance app to a single bank account or track steps but not heart rate.
H10
Data collection consent is dynamic: if new types of data are being collected, consent is renewed in situ.H11
Data processing consent is dynamic: if the purpose of processing changes, consent is renewed.H12
Data distribution consent is dynamic: if the actors’ data are distributed to changes, consent is renewed.H13
Consent to store and process data can be revoked at any time: with the service and any other actors.H14
Can control where data are stored.H15
Access or Participation: These address issues such as whether people are able to view the data they have provided and whether they can
verify its accuracy in a timely manner.
All raw collected data can be extracted from the service (in-app or via vendor’s website).H16
All data are available in standard text formats (CSVb, XML, JSONc, GPXd, etc).H17
Data extraction is available from within the service, for example, without raising a request with support.H18
Programmatic access to data is possible, for example, app programming interfaces are exposed.H19
Social Disclosure Usability: These relate to the usability of interface elements that allow users to share data with third-party services, for
example, social networking sites.
Privacy controls are per-disclosure, for example, individual workouts can be published to a social networking
site, not relying solely on global defaults.
H20
Privacy controls allow granular sharing of data types, for example, when sharing a workout, the distance can
be shared but not the pace.
H21
Error prevention: is explicit confirmation acquired before a disclosure?H22
Minimize user memory load: Effects of a disclosure are visible throughout the disclosure flow (ie, memory of
earlier decisions not required).
H23
Minimalist: During the disclosure flow no extraneous information (such as adverts or irrelevant user interface
elements) is displayed.
H24
Consistency: Information shown during the disclosure flow is consistent with the effect of the disclosure.H25
Help and documentation: Contextual help with making privacy decisions is available.H26
aSee Multimedia Appendix 1 for the scoring criteria.
bCSV: comma-separated values.
cJSON: JavaScript Object Notation.
dGPX: GPS eXchange Format.
JMIR Mhealth Uhealth 2018 | vol. 6 | iss. 10 | e185 | p.4http://mhealth.jmir.org/2018/10/e185/
(page number not for citation purposes)
Hutton et alJMIR MHEALTH AND UHEALTH
XSL•FO
RenderX
Table 2. The categories of apps used in our evaluation and the constituent search keywords for each group.
KeywordsPurpose and app category
mHealth
CyclingCycling
Diet, eatingDiet
Exercise, workoutsExercise
N/AaApps with wearable hardware
Heartrate, heart rateHeart
Mood, happinessMood
Walking, runningRunning
SleepSleep
StepsStep count
Weight, body fatWeight
Other self-tracking metrics
Spending, incomeSpending
Time keepingTime
aN/A: not applicable.
Using the Heuristics to Evaluate Self-tracking Apps
To demonstrate the value of the heuristics for assessing privacy,
we conducted a formal evaluation using a subset of mHealth
and self-tracking apps from the Google Play Store. We focused
on this platform because the Android mobile operating system
was installed on approximately 85% of new smartphones
shipped worldwide from 2016 to 2017 [32] and because
Google’s policy for vetting apps is less restrictive than Apple’s
or Microsoft’s policy [33], making it an attractive platform to
collect a broad range of self-tracking apps.
To gather apps for our analysis, we used the responses to a 2014
survey of 105 members of the London Quantified Self Meetup
Group [34] (Multimedia Appendix 2) to identify the types of
data they collected. We then translated these into potential
categories of apps to inform our search. We did this because no
comprehensive taxonomy of self-tracking apps currently exists
and because the London Group is one of the most
well-established QS groups with a large number of early
adopters who have experience with a broad range of tracking
technologies.
After aggregating and ranking the survey responses, we used
the 20 most-frequently reported types of data to produce a series
of keywords such as “weight,” “sleep,” and “mood.” These
keywords were supplied as input to a script that performed a
keyword search on the Google Play Store. Each keyword search
returned a list of apps relevant to that term. Next, metadata about
each app was parsed from the Google Play Store and saved to
a CSV file.
Our search produced an initial list of 345 apps; this was reduced
to 292 after excluding instructional apps that demonstrate how
to perform an exercise correctly. We excluded these apps
because they do not capture data that can permit self-tracking.
After this, we used market data from International Data
Corporation via Statista [35] to identify major commercial
vendors whose apps were not included in our search. Identified
vendors were Xiaomi and Jawbone, whose Mi Fit and UP apps
were manually added to the dataset. (The code used to produce
this dataset and the dataset used in this analysis are available in
a public repository [36].)
To sort the 292 apps into categories, we grouped keywords on
the basis of similarity and characterized each app as either
pertaining to mHealth or other self-tracking activities. Table 2
shows the outcomes of this classification and lists the 12
categories with the associated keywords that were used in this
study.
To narrow the scope of our privacy evaluation and make the
process more manageable, we elected to focus on a subset of
the 292 apps. We did this by selecting the 7 most popular apps
in each of the 12 categories (or as many as possible in categories
with <7 apps); this resulted in a final list of 64 apps [37]
(Multimedia Appendix 3).
Each of these apps was allocated to 1 of 4 reviewers to apply
the heuristics independently. These reviewers had experience
with self-tracking and evaluation of software systems, meaning
that they were appropriately skilled to perform the evaluation.
Apps were installed on an Android smartphone running Android
6.0 (chosen because it was the most popular version throughout
2017 [38]). Reviewers were instructed to review the user
interface of each app, the terms of service, and the app’s privacy
policy to check the app against each of the 26 heuristics
thoroughly. During the evaluation, if a heuristic did not apply
to a particular app, it was scored as “not applicable” and that
app was not considered in the analysis of a particular heuristic.
(This is a common approach in the use of heuristics in usability
evaluation [25].) For example, many apps do not allow data to
be shared with SNSs, and it would not make sense to apply H20
to H26 to these apps. The relevance of particular heuristics
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should, therefore, be made at the discretion of the evaluator,
given the particular functionality of the app under consideration.
To assess the interrater reliability in applying the heuristics, 12
apps were chosen at random to be evaluated by a second
reviewer. Apps were allocated such that all reviewers had
evaluated the work of each of their peers at least once. The
interrater reliability was assessed using Cohen kappa [39], which
suggested a moderate agreement between raters (kappa=.45).
Disagreements between the raters arose primarily from
confusion over the apps’ privacy policies, which were often
unclear in terms of language and intent. Reviewers discussed
these issues to resolve the disagreement and come to a
consensus.
The outcome of the analysis was an overall privacy score for
each of the 64 apps, with the score calculated by summing the
ratings that each app achieved against each of the applicable
heuristics, implying that scores should not be interpreted linearly
but rather as a reflection of the total number of heuristics that
were applicable to the app. (This means that the score can also
be expressed as a percentage by calculating the total possible
score that an app could have achieved, given the total number
of heuristics that are applicable to it.) In the next section, we
discuss the results of the heuristic evaluation in terms of
differences between app categories and significant effects.
Results
Of the 64 examined apps, only 1 failed all of its applicable
heuristics. This app, a “gratitude journal” named Bliss (Figure
2), invites users to create an account when first launching the
app, but does not offer any information about how user data are
handled, which was a common issue among self-tracking apps
in general. The gratitude journal Bliss performed poorly in the
heuristic evaluation, satisfying none of the heuristics it was
tested against. No mHealth apps had a maximum possible score
on all applicable heuristics, but one self-tracking app (adhk’s
Timesheet) performed well on all applicable heuristics. This
app only stores data locally on the user’s device, avoiding most
of the issues regarding the sharing and storage of data that are
covered by the heuristics. The mean heuristic satisfaction (of
the maximum possible score) for each app was 46.2% (SD
24.3%), with high variability between apps. To analyze these
data, we fit an appropriate cumulative link mixed model
(CLMM), an ordinal regression model that exploits the
categorical nature of our heuristic scoring, with the ability to
account for random effects such as multiple ratings of the same
app [40]. This allows for an investigation of the differences
between different categories of apps, as well as whether apps
for mHealth differ from other types of self-tracking apps in
terms of privacy.
While the relationship between the app category (as listed in
Table 2) and its performance was variable, the CLMM
demonstrated that the type of app was not a useful predictor of
its performance. Figure 3 shows the wide variability in
performance across apps of different types. Weight-tracking
apps performed best, and cycling apps performed worst;
however, the type of app is not a significant predictor of
performance. One interesting finding was that apps from broadly
similar categories (in terms of their purpose and functionality)
often scored very differently when evaluated against our
heuristics. For example, apps that track “exercise” performed
well, achieving a mean of 69.2% (SD 48%) of the maximum
heuristic score on average, whereas functionally similar cycling
apps were among the worst performers, scoring only a mean of
27.4% (SD 37.9%). This result is surprising given that we might
intuitively expect the sensitivity of the data collected by an app
to relate to the privacy strategies adopted by its developers.
Following this, we considered whether the maturity of an app’s
position in the marketplace led to a better performance. For
example, one might imagine that the developers of higher profile
and more established apps would have had time to respond to
increased scrutiny with better privacy controls. However, our
attempts to explore this question using the number of downloads,
the average star rating, or the total number of ratings as a proxy
for maturity failed to indicate a significant relationship.
We next explored differences among 4 dimensions of privacy
captured by our heuristics, focusing on how the dimensions are
upheld at a high level. Figure 4 demonstrates the differences in
performance among the 4 categories, which was broadly similar
except for access to user data, which was significantly poorer.
Most apps failed to offer users sufficient access to their own
data, despite this being a fundamental aspect of many data
protection regimes. The CLMM showed significantly higher
performance for the consent and notice heuristics than for access,
but not for social disclosure usability [1.5 (95% CI 0.8 to 2.2),
P<.001; 1.6 (95% CI 0.9 to 2.3), P<.001; and 0.2 (95% CI −0.7
to 1.1), P=.63, respectively]. The relatively low scoring of apps
on the access dimension can be partly attributed to the
dichotomous manner in which apps allow users to access (and,
thus, keep a personal record of) their data. We found that apps
either allow the user to export all of their data in a range of text
formats or offer no export capabilities whatsoever. Some apps
restrict the ability to export data unless the user pays money to
“unlock” the app or subscribe to a premium tier. We considered
a paywall between users and their own data to be unsatisfactory
in terms of meeting the heuristics for the analysis.
Looking closer at the performance of apps with respect to
individual heuristics, we observed a great variability in
performance. Figure 5 shows the distribution of scores across
all heuristics. Note that the horizontal length of bars differs
because not all heuristics are applicable to each app. A CLMM
suggested significantly poor results for 13 heuristics. The most
pertinent examples include the following:
• H19, concerning programmatic access to data, had a
particularly low score (−2.5 [95% CI −3.2 to −1.7], P<.001).
Only 20% (13/64) of apps offered any kind of access to
data.
• H21, concerning the ability to share granular QS data with
SNSs (−4 [95% CI −5.6 to −2.5], P<.001), was permitted
by a mere 6% (4/64) of apps.
• H26, concerning the availability of contextual support when
making privacy decisions (−3.1 [95% CI −4.3 to −1.9],
P<.001), was met by 10% (6/64) of apps.
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Figure 2. Screenshot of initial login screen of the Bliss app.
Only 2 heuristics indicated a significant positive effect:
• H9, concerning the requirement for consent processes to
be opt-in rather than opt-out (1.4 [95% CI 0.7 to 2.1],
P<.001), was the best-performing heuristic, with 78%
(50/64) of apps scoring above 0.
• H14, concerning the ability to revoke consent for services
to use data (1.6 [95% CI 0.8 to 2.3], P<.001), was met by
54% (35/74) of apps.
Finally, we compared the performance of mHealth apps with
self-tracking apps, which focus on nonhealth data, that is,
productivity and time keeping (see Table 2). A CLMM revealed
that nonhealth-related self-tracking apps performed significantly
better in the heuristic analysis (95% CI 0.1 to 0.7, P=.02). This
is of concern given that data collected by mHealth apps are
likely to be highly personal and individualized, which, combined
with the performance of these apps on the heuristic analysis,
suggests that the risk of privacy violations may be higher than
what is desired.
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Figure 3. Boxplot showing how performance on the privacy heuristics varies across different types of apps.
Figure 4. Boxplot showing the differences in performance among the 4 groups of heuristics.
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Figure 5. Boxplot showing differences in performance among the 4 groups of heuristics.
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Discussion
Principal Findings
This paper presented a heuristic approach for assessing the
privacy features of self-tracking apps. Our heuristics cover 4
key dimensions of information privacy and provide a method
for evaluating privacy across a wide range of self-tracking and
mHealth apps. We used the heuristics to evaluate 64 popular
Android apps that were designed to collect QS data. Our analysis
produced several key findings that provide a view on the current
state of privacy in self-tracking apps.
First, we found that the majority of apps performed poorly when
gauged against our heuristics, with access to user data
particularly lacking (see Figure 4). Examples of areas in which
the majority of apps scored poorly include providing
programmatic access to data (H19), allowing control over the
granularity of data when they are shared (H21), and the
availability of help and documentation to support decision
making (H26). Moreover, we found the category of data
collected by the app was not a significant predictor of its privacy
performance. This demonstrates that there is no single category
of app that performs universally well; rather, the strength of
privacy features tends to vary across app categories. In addition,
Figure 3 demonstrates that the strength of privacy features often
varies within app categories. These findings are important
because they suggest that privacy stands to be improved across
the spectrum of self-tracking apps, warranting the development
of standards that can ensure that users’ privacy is upheld in
future designs.
The second finding was that app maturity was not a predictor
of its strength in terms of privacy. Intuitively, consumers with
privacy concerns might favor the services of established market
players under the assumption that the apps provided by them
are mature and, hence, stronger in terms of privacy [41].
However, our analysis shows that common proxies for an app’s
maturity such as the number of downloads or the rating an app
has received are not useful predictors of how privacy-preserving
an app will be. This again draws attention to the potential for
privacy features to be enhanced across the self-tracking app
landscape, irrespective of the reputation of an app’s developer.
One noteworthy point here is that the measures we used to
evaluate an app’s maturity cannot be taken as a ground truth
measure, suggesting that this variable should, therefore, be
explored more thoroughly in future work.
Our third main finding was that apps classed as tracking data
relevant to mHealth (physical activity, mood, and so on)
exhibited significantly higher privacy issues than other
self-tracking apps. This is of significant concern given that
mHealth data have the potential to be highly revealing about a
users’ life and, in turn, could lead to harmful or embarrassing
situations if the privacy of these data is not upheld. During our
evaluation, we noticed that nonmHealth apps tend to store data
on users’ devices rather than sharing them with third parties,
and it is this practice that gives them a higher privacy score. It
is not clear from this analysis, however, why this disparity has
emerged in the design of these apps. A cause of concern is that
health data may be perceived to be of significant commercial
value by designers, so a requirement to share data with vendors
is built into the design of such apps to exploit this. In turn,
designers might gloss over this issue by “marketing” the sharing
of data as something that is solely beneficial to users, for
example, to allow synchronization of data between devices,
without drawing attention to the associated privacy issues. The
inadequate consent mechanisms frequently employed in
self-tracking apps mean that users cannot make an informed
decision about whether this trade-off is acceptable.
Overall, the importance placed on privacy in QS and mHealth
apps is highly variable, and it may, therefore, be difficult for
end users to make informed decisions about which apps will
provide the functionality they desire while meeting their privacy
requirements. We believe that drawing attention to these issues
should motivate the development of standards and guidelines
that can ensure that future self-tracking apps are stronger with
respect to upholding users’ privacy. In addition, our study
provides evidence on the value of our heuristic evaluation
approach for assessing privacy issues more generally. Using
the heuristics will allow designers to consider key privacy
concerns when developing and evaluating self-tracking apps in
the future. The heuristics should also orient the designers to
look toward the regulatory landscape for guidance on
privacy-upholding features. Furthermore, the heuristics may
guide data controllers in conducting impact assessments for
privacy and data protection, such as those mandated by Article
35 of the EU’s GDPR [20], which state that the review must be
systematic but offer no guidance as to which aspects to prioritize
or how to ensure coverage. The heuristics could be used to
perform an initial “triage” assessment of data protection, with
low scores in sections 1 and 2 indicating areas of concern. This
could then flag that a more detailed impact assessment is
necessary.
While we have applied the heuristics to a set of 64 self-tracking
apps, we note that the heuristics were created on the basis of
the wider regulatory landscape, and thus, they might also be
generalizable to other types of apps that collect data from users.
However, our study was focused on self-tracking apps, and thus,
we see this as an area that should be explored in future work.
Reviewing the Heuristics
Our heuristics were designed to address 4 key questions
regarding user privacy. We now consider the extent to which
the apps we examined satisfy these 4 questions.
Do Users Know What Will Happen to Their Data Before
Using an App?
The 7 notice heuristics (H1 to H7) address fundamental
descriptive aspects of a user’s relationship with a particular
service in terms of who is responsible for the user’s data, what
the service will do with it, and who the data will be shared with.
Of the 80% (51/64) apps in our sample that collected personal
data from users, only 29 included terms of service or a privacy
policy to explain how data will be used and none required these
policies to be read or comprehended before proceeding with
registration. Basic information was missing in many cases, such
as the name of the organization collecting the data (25% of apps,
16/64) and who such data might be shared with (39% of apps,
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25/64). Many apps allow registration via several routes, using
the single sign-on app programming interfaces provided by
companies such as Facebook or Google to simplify the
registration process for users and to provide the developer with
a valuable connection to a user’s Web-based identity. However,
many apps that we examined exhibited a pattern whereby using
such a registration route bypassed the usual exposure to an app’s
terms of service or consent to marketing communications,
despite the potential added sensitivity of giving the providers
access to their social network identity. High-profile apps from
Nike+, Endomondo, and MapMyRide all exhibited this behavior.
While Fitbit includes a link to its terms of service and privacy
policy from within the app, these are dated 2011 and 2012,
respectively, despite both documents having been updated in
2015 and 2016.
While it is well understood that lengthy terms of service are
often not sufficiently readable [42] and that most people do not
read them [43], it is of concern that so many apps, including
those from QS market leaders, fail to provide information about
the way their services function in situ. With data protection
regimes such as the EU’s GDPR strengthening the requirements
for clear privacy notices at the time of data collection, it is
evident that this is being regularly subverted by many
self-tracking apps. US-based companies can self-certify their
compliance with the Privacy Shield framework to signify that
data exchanged between the United States and EU broadly
correspond with EU data protection requirements. Notably,
Under Armour, which provides MyFitnessPal, Endomondo, and
MapMyRide, among a number of other successful self-tracking
apps and devices, has a Privacy Shield certification that
explicitly excludes these apps [44].
Do Users Have Control Over Their Data?
The 8 choice and consent heuristics (H8 to H15) concern the
ability of users to sanction particular uses of their data and
revoke consent from the app or connected services and devices.
Most apps require an explicit form of consent before collecting
data; however, the extent to which such consent is meaningful
or sufficient is difficult to determine, with people’s privacy
attitudes frequently changing and potentially voiding their
previous consent decisions [45], with a sustained approach to
acquiring the consent necessary to renegotiate this relationship
over time [46]. In some instances, the consent process includes
a combination of opt-in, opt-out, or prefilled elements, which
can be confusing for users and lead to oversharing of information
or exposure to unexpected marketing communications, as shown
in Fitbit’s sign-up interface in Figure 6. In addition, most apps
reserve the ability to renegotiate the user’s relationship with the
service unilaterally by changing terms of service or privacy
policies without gaining explicit consent from users. Even if a
user is satisfied with the way a company operates its service at
the time of registration, the service can change significantly
without the user’s knowledge, thereby compromising the value
of his or her consent. While some apps, such as Nike+, commit
to notifying users and gaining consent if the use of personal
data changes, this is still uncommon among self-tracking apps.
While 36% of apps examined only keep data on the user’s
device, among those that involve sharing data with a remote
provider, 63% do not provide users with control over where
their data are stored, requiring users to trust that the vendor, or
their choice of storage provider, can be trusted upon. Such
efforts to ensure that data provided by users remain proprietary
and siloed is a concern, which is further confirmed in our study
of the third dimension of privacy.
Figure 6. Partial screenshot of the Fitbit Android app account creation page.
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Do Users Have Access to the Data They Have Provided?
The 4 access and participation heuristics (H16 to H19) concern
users’ ability to extract the data they have provided from an
app. Data portability is an increasingly sensitive issue in Internet
services, with data protection regimes increasingly
acknowledging portability as a right. Despite the fact that
self-tracking requires the disclosure of potentially sensitive data
to a range of data controllers, most services do not give people
unfettered access to their own data, as indicated by the low
scores for these access heuristics reported in Figure 4. Only
26% of services allow people to export all of their data, and
60% provide no means of exporting data. Our finding that only
16% apps provide programmatic access to data through public
app programming interfaces supports the conclusion that
mHealth and QS services are encouraging people to silo their
data to prevent portability.
Can Users Control Their Disclosures to Third Parties?
While many services are keen to function as self-contained
entities, some permit users to disclose their activity to third-party
services such as SNSs. Such functionality has benefits for users
who use SNSs to build social capital [47], which can be
reinforced through the presentation of self-tracking activity such
as weight loss or running performance; this, in turn, can support
behavioral change [48]. For the developers of self-tracking
services, this is a simple way to promote their service through
evangelical users and associate their brand with positive
behaviors. Over 40% of apps allow users to publish their activity
to third-party services and meet most of the fundamental
usability measures. Only 11% of apps, however, provide
contextual privacy help, such as explaining the effect of sharing
information with different audiences. Most of the heuristics in
this category (H20 to H26) had high scores for the apps
examined, which, in part, may be attributed to the use of the
authentication software development kit provided by major
SNSs, such as Facebook and Twitter, which provide their own
native privacy controls and audience selectors in response to
ongoing privacy issues with their platforms.
As self-tracking apps continue to evolve, they will incorporate
new types of sensors, a greater fidelity of captured data, the
ability to provide richer analysis, and more accurate inferences.
Current apps are mostly delivered through smartphones and
wristwear; however, this is often associated with usability issues
due to small or absent displays. Therefore, we can anticipate
that in the near future, sensors will increasingly be embedded
in biological and interfaceless apps, reducing the usability
barriers to adopting such technologies, while potentially
introducing new privacy risks when it becomes harder to
configure the appropriate sharing of information. We, therefore,
propose that these heuristics can be used as a form of
certification attached to the marketing of products in app stores
and other channels. This would allow people to compare the
privacy characteristics of apps that offer similar functionality
and encourage developers to incorporate innovative
privacy-preserving functionality, thus, treating privacy as a
value-adding marketable feature.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, using the results of a
survey from a QS meetup group was sufficient to capture the
types of data people are interested in tracking. It is not clear,
however, whether the self-selected QS community is
representative of the cohort of users who use such technologies
but may not consider themselves self-trackers, nor have any
affinity with self-tracking as a practice. For example, by far,
the most popular app that we examined was Simple Design
Ltd’s Period Calendar, which was 38% more popular than the
next-ranked app MyFitnessPal. The former was only included
in our scrape of Google Play as it matched the “mood” keyword.
Considering the popularity of the app, it is plausible that the QS
community is significantly biased toward men, and therefore,
our analysis may have omitted some self-tracking apps.
Similarly, regional differences may have caused us to miss some
apps. Our study used the UK Google Play Store, and the list of
apps returned may differ from that produced if the scrape was
performed in another region. For example, the financial tracking
app Mint [49] is only available in the United States, and so it
did not appear in our list of apps, despite having nearly 10
million downloads.
In terms of our findings, we have designed the heuristics and
the process of obtaining and reviewing apps to be reproducible,
but we do not yet know how robust the heuristics are to changes
in technology, as the privacy implications and usability
challenges we observe may be tightly coupled to the modalities
of smartphones and wearables, which currently dominate the
self-tracking landscape. Cohen kappa for our interrater reliability
only showed moderate agreement, which may be attributed to
the varying interpretation of legal language in privacy policies
and term & conditions as well as the fact that only on a subset
of apps was compared by pairs of raters. Increasing the number
of raters per app might address this issue.
In addition, the finding that mHealth apps performed worse on
privacy is worthy of deeper investigation given the
aforementioned possibility of selection bias in our app sample
and differences in sample size between the mHealth and
nonmHealth app categories. In addition, it would be helpful to
consider how the heuristics can be reconciled with the fact that
different aspects of privacy can become more or less relevant
to users depending on their context [50,51]. The heuristics in
our study were applied by expert evaluators without attending
to the context, primarily because the heuristics are designed to
embody a set of issues that should be applicable across a range
of settings (eg, the usability of disclosure controls).
Nevertheless, understanding whether users might actually desire
less stringent privacy controls in certain contexts is an area for
future work.
In terms of our method, the heuristics can be time consuming
to apply because they require a close reading of terms of service.
In addition, they require many functional routes of an app to be
explored in order to identify discrepancies. In future work, we
plan to investigate whether natural language processing can be
used to parse and semiautomatically apply some of the heuristics
to the terms of service and privacy policies. Work by Slavin et
al [52] has focused on detecting privacy policy violations in
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Android app code, and similar techniques could be used to
automatically apply the privacy policy heuristics as well as those
concerned with exporting data.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced a novel heuristic evaluation
method for examining the state of privacy in QS apps. We found
that the majority of apps do not meet our privacy criteria,
including notification of fundamental data protection
characteristics, or the criteria on ability to export user data.
High-profile apps are among those that exhibit poor privacy
behaviors, which can make it difficult for users to make
informed choices about which apps to trust with their data. Our
heuristics can provide designers with a resource to maintain
privacy in the design of self-tracking services and avoid common
pitfalls, which can engender mistrust or lead to privacy issues.
As the heuristics were guided by both the EU and US regulatory
environment, they may also help guide data controllers to
perform impact assessments for both privacy and data protection.
We have provided the tools and documentation necessary to
replicate our findings and confirm the usability of the heuristics
and allow the evolving privacy landscape to be evaluated. In
future work, we will examine the usefulness of the heuristics
by using them to capture people’s privacy preferences and
recommend services that meet their requirements.
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